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Abstract 
Consider a shopper or tourist driving downtown and trying to park. Two 
strategies are usually available: either park at a private off-street facility or search for 
a cheaper on-street spot. We formalise such a setting and use the model to study 
optimal government regulation of the on-street parking market. It is shown that the 
optimal on-street fee equals the marginal cost of off-street supply at the optimal 
quantity. If the off-street market is supplied under constant returns to scale, this 
provides a particular simple operational rule: the price on street should match that off 
street. We also extend the model to consider maximum length of stay restrictions and 
non-competitive private supply. A numerical model, calibrated to central London, 
investigates the magnitude of an optimal fee.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In most cities of the industrialised world, governments intervene in the urban 
parking market on a regular basis. Common examples include the setting (and 
enforcing) of on-street parking fees and maximum length of stay restrictions, the 
direct provision of space on street and the use of the planning system to regulate 
private supply. When considering the microeconomics of this intervention, a natural 
focal point to consider is the first-best price of a fixed supply of space on street.1 
Three recent papers (Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1995), Arnott and 
Rowse (1999) and Anderson and de Palma (2003)) consider the first-best pricing of 
on-street parking space. However all these articles, as well as the non-formal seminal 
piece in this area by William Vickrey (1959), consider the problem in the absence of 
the off-street (or facility) parking market.  
This seems overly restrictive. Consider a shopper or a tourist driving 
downtown and deciding where to park. Two strategies are commonly available: either 
proceed to an off-street (and often private) parking facility or search for a vacant spot 
on street. If parking on street is cheaper than off street, a driver who successfully finds 
a vacant on-street spot enjoys greater surplus than an off-street parker. In equilibrium, 
therefore, a subset of drivers will choose to search such that the average search cost 
equals the expected value of the additional surplus. The lower the relative price of on-
street parking (relative to the off-street market), the greater the number of drivers that 
'invest' in socially wasteful searching. In order to minimise search costs, therefore, the 
government can set the on-street meter fee equal to the off street price. Indeed, if the 
                                                     
1 Several authors also consider the optimal price of parking in the presence of underpriced externalities 
associated with road use e.g. Arnott et al. (1991), Glazer and Niskanen (1992) and Calthrop et al. 
(2000). See also Young (2000) for a review of engineering models of parking. 
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supply of off-street space is competitive, we will show that this rule is welfare 
maximising.  
This insight also has implications in terms of the choice of on-street regulatory 
instrument adopted by the government. The additional surplus from parking on street 
is relatively large if parking is free (albeit subject to a maximum length of stay 
restriction). We might therefore expect more searching when the on-street market is 
regulated via a time restriction than a meter fee. In short, effective management of the 
on-street market would seem to depend in an important way upon pricing conditions 
at the rival facility market. This element is missing from the existing literature on 
parking. 
We construct a simple model to analyse optimal on-street parking regulation 
in the presence of a close substitute market. If the private off-street market is 
competitive, we derive a simple welfare maximising policy rule: set the price per time 
unit on street equal to the resource cost of off-street parking at the optimal quantity. In 
the case of constant returns to scale, this rule is particularly easy to implement. 
Optimal on-street regulation reduces to matching the price off street. Pricing below 
this rate induces too many drivers to invest in socially wasteful searching. Pricing 
higher induces all drivers to use the off-street market, which results in excessive 
supply costs (compared with drivers using the zero-resource cost on-street space). 
Our findings differ from the existing literature. Vickrey (1959) assumes an 
aggregate demand curve for on-street parking defined over own-price alone and 
advocates a policy of peak-load pricing.2 But this formulation is somewhat 
unsatisfactory: for instance, how does the peak-load price relate to the price charged 
                                                     
2 Vickrey (1959) also considers uncertain demand. He advocates a ‘demand-responsive’ pricing rule: 
allow the meter fee rate to rise with the occupation rate in the immediate vicinity. As Arnott and Rowse 
(1999) note, however, this is not guaranteed to result in a first-best allocation.  
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on the rival market? Our reasoning above suggests that aggregate search needs to be 
specified as a function of the price on both parking markets.  
Both Arnott and Rowse (1999) and Anderson and de Palma (2003)3 consider 
on-street pricing in explicitly spatial settings. On-street parking is an open-access 
resource: drivers’ decisions are based on the average rather than the marginal search 
cost. The optimal parking fee is shown to equal the marginal external search cost, 
which aligns private incentives with the social planner’s. Both papers assume that 
(on-street) parking spots are imperfect substitutes. Arnott and Rowse (1999) assume a 
homogeneous city located on the outside of a circle. Symmetry implies that the 
optimal parking fee is independent of location. Anderson and de Palma (2003) assume 
a linear city in which spots nearer the single point CBD are more desirable than those 
further away (due to reduced walk time). In equilibrium, the density of parking 
declines with distance from the CBD. As a result, marginal external search cost, and 
hence the optimal fee, declines with distance from the CBD. 
These findings are important and relate primarily to the explicitly spatial 
nature of the search process. However, as stressed above, they abstract from the 
presence of a rival off-street market. In order to focus sharply on the influence of a 
rival market, we adopt a highly reduced form representation of space. We also 
abstract from randomness in demand. In this regard, our model differs from the well-
known findings on endogenous search processes (e.g. De Vany (1976), De Vany and 
Savings (1977)).  
We extend our basic model in two directions, both new to the literature. 
Firstly, we examine both quantity and price regulation. In many urban areas, on-street 
time restrictions, permitting a maximum length of stay, are a common alternative to 
                                                     
3 This paper can be seen as a generalisation of Verhoef et al. (1995) 
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meter fees. We show that a simple time restriction, in which the driver pays no charge 
as long as he parks for less than a given length of time, is welfare inferior to an 
optimal meter fee. Secondly, we consider the optimal on-street pricing policy in the 
realistic setting of a non-competitive off-street market. We adopt a simple Stackelberg 
setting, in which the government (the leader) plays against a single off-street supplier 
(the follower). We show that the optimal price on street deviates from the matching 
rule. Rather, a ‘knife-edge’ result emerges. The on-street price is either raised just to 
the point that the off-street supplier is induced to undercut the on-street market, or it is 
raised as high as possible without inducing undercutting. In our numerical model, 
calibrated to central London, we show, perhaps surprisingly, how often it is optimal 
for the on-street market to be undercut. In doing so, government loses tax revenues, 
but this is more than outweighed by the gain in consumer surplus from lower parking 
prices. However, the reverse case is also well within the range of plausible 
parameters. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we set out the basic 
model. Section 3 examines the centralised allocation problem: how would demand be 
allocated to supply if government can control all driver decisions? This is an 
important benchmark. Section 4 compares the optimal centralised allocation with that 
attainable under decentralised decision making when the off-street market is supplied 
by a perfectly competitive market. Both linear and non-linear pricing schedules are 
considered. Section 5 relaxes the competitive off-street market assumption. Results 
are derived analytically and optimal values are computed with a numerical example. 
Sensitivity analysis investigates the generality of findings. Section 6 concludes.  
We conjecture that the findings in this paper (in the context of parking 
policies) may be relevant to the general theory on the public provision of private 
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goods. The essence of the model is that the public sector has a cost advantage over 
private supply, at least for an initial number of units. Rationing is random. This 
structure suggests a relevance to the health sector (with rationing by waiting times) or 
utility provision (with rationing by shortage). The paper’s findings also relate to the 
literature on public policy in a duopoly market (see Bös (1985)). 
 
2. The model  
 
2.1. Consumer benefit 
 
We assume a continuum of N  identical risk-neutral consumers. To simplify 
matters, we assume that the utility from parking for t  units of time (during the peak 
period) is given by a quasi-linear function, ( )u t . This function is assumed to be 
continuous and strictly concave ( ( ) 0u t′′ < ), while the marginal benefit of parking is 
assumed to be exhausted after time T  (thus ( ) 0u T′ = ). Parking is supplied on two 
markets: an on-street market (indexed by X ) and off-street market (indexed by Y ). 
The two markets are perfect substitutes.4 
On either market, a consumer decides how long to park on the basis of a 
constant per time unit fee, ip  with { , }i X Y∈ (In section 4.2. we explore the use of 
non-linear pricing schedules). Each consumer parks until the marginal benefit equals 
marginal cost: ( )i iu t p′ =  and hence ( )i it p . Consumer surplus, conditional on using 
market i , is denoted by ( )iv p . Finally, note that concavity of the utility function 
implies a shorter length of stay if the price rises i.e. 1 ( ) 0i it u t′ ′′= < . 
                                                     
4 This assumption can be easily relaxed: one market might be safer than another, or closer to a desired 
destination. In a model with identical consumers, however, this difference just acts as a fixed term. We 
comment further on preference heterogeneity in the concluding section. 
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2.2. Supply technology 
 
The on-street market is characterised by a fixed supply of space, such that 
aggregate demand equals on-street supply when each individual parks for Q  units of 
time ( 0Q > ). The opportunity cost of on-street parking space is assumed to be zero. 
In contrast, aggregate parking time, Nt , is supplied off-street with a continuous, 
increasing and convex cost function, ( )C Nt . To keep the problem interesting, we 
assume (0) (0)u C′ ′> . We consider both the case of constant returns to scale (C′′=0) 
and a fixed capacity constraint at Nr  units of time, ( ( )C Nr′ = ∞ ). 
 
2.3. Rationing rule 
 
If demand for on-street parking is greater than supply, we assume that the 
probability of finding a vacant on-street spot is given by a random-rationing rule, 
familiar from the literature on capacity-constrained firms (see, for example, Davison 
and Deneckere (1986)). Denoting the fraction of consumers that choose to search for a 
vacant on-street spot by λ , the per capita demand for on-street parking is Xtλ . Thus 
the probability of finding a vacant on-street spot, ρ , is given by 
 ( , ) ,1
( )X X X
Qp Min
t p
ρ λ λ
 =   
. (1) 
For any given price for on-street parking, the probability of finding a vacant spot, ρ , 
equals 1 if the fraction of consumers choosing to search, λ , is less than or equal 
to / XQ t . To ease notation below, we denote the number of searchers, such that 
demand at a particular price equals supply as ( )Xpλ .  
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The rationing rule is justified if drivers arrive in a downtown area more or less 
at random. We consider this well suited to modelling parking in city centres for 
shopping, tourism and leisure activities. It is clearly far less suited to modelling 
workplace parking, where spots are often reserved. 
 
2.4. Search costs 
 
Searching for an on-street spot is assumed costly. This cost is denoted by S . 
An explicit expression for S might be derived from first principles using stochastic 
queueing theory, depending upon assumptions regarding consumer behaviour (length 
of stay, decision to balk or not) and supply conditions (number of servers, servers in 
parallel or series etc.). In general, however, closed form solutions do not exist (see, 
for example, Grimmet and Stirzaker (2001)). We therefore adopt a reduced-form 
representation consistent with a central feature of formal queueing models: the shorter 
the average length of stay (i.e. the greater the expected service rate), the lower the 
expected search cost.5 Thus we specify a continuous function ( )S ρ with 0S ′ < . 
Moreover, we assume that the expected search cost equals zero if a vacant spot is 
found for certain: (1) 0S = . 
 
2.5. Equilibrium number of searchers 
 
                                                     
5 For instance, the explicit wait time for a simple M/D/1 queue is given by 2/ 2(1 )λ σ µ− where λ is 
the expected arrival rate (and equivalent to λ in our model), µ is the service rate (equivalent to the 
inverse of Xt  in our model) and σ λ µ≡ . It is clear that wait time declines in the service rate. 
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Each consumer decides whether to search for an on-street spot or proceed 
directly to the off-street market. The expected payoff from searching for a vacant on-
street spot is given by 
 [ ] ( ) ( )( , , ) ( ) 1S X Y X Yv p p v p v p Sλ ρ ρ ρ= + − − , (2) 
where, recall, ρ  is a function of λ  and Xp . This equation can be solved for the 
equilibrium number of searchers, *λ  i.e. a number of searchers such that any one 
consumer cannot increase her expected payoff by switching from searching to not 
searching, or vice-versa. For a non-symmetric equilibrium, i.e. 0 1λ< < , this implies 
that *λ  is such that 
 *( , , ) ( )S X Y Y Yv p p v pλ = . (3) 
Substituting from (2) into (3), with simple re-arrangement, gives that in equilibrium, 
consumers search until the expected net surplus from searching equals the expected 
marginal cost, or 
 ( ) ( )( )X Yv p v p Sρ ρ− =   . (4) 
Recall ( , )Xpρ ρ λ= . Hence equation (4) can be solved to give *( , )X Yp pλ  when 
X Yp p≤ .6 If not, i.e. X Yp p> , all drivers park off street and * 0λ = . To simplify the 
analysis, we restrict attention to * 1λ < .7 If X Yp p= , condition (4) holds if and only 
if 1ρ = . This is the case, recalling (1), if * [0, ( )]Ypλ λ∈ . To ensure existence of 
optima, we assume *( , ) ( )Y Y Yp p pλ λ=  i.e. drivers have an epsilon preference for 
                                                     
6 It is straightforward to show that the derivative of Sv with respect to λ is negative i.e. an interior 
solution, when it exists, is unique. 
7Although conceptually straightforward to include, allowing for * 1λ = complicates the notation 
without adding addition insight - see Calthrop and Proost (2002). Moreover, this assumption is 
consistent with our numerical model (Figure 1). 
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parking on street. This implies that the *λ  function is discontinuous: as X Yp p→  
from above, *λ jumps (in the limit) from 0  to λ .  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
Figure 1 plots the equilibrium number of searchers from our numerical model. 
We assume a linear demand curve for parking and constant returns to scale off-street. 
The unknowns in our model are calibrated to data published for central London. The 
details of this procedure are provided in Annex B. The Figure plots three functions. 
The dashed line plots ( )Xpλ : the fraction of drivers such that 1ρ = . For example, 
with a price of €10 per hour, approximately one-third of all drivers can be 
accommodated on street. At the higher price of €25 per hour, each driver parks for a 
shorter period of time, and thus nearly one-half of all drivers can park on street. The 
set to the northwest of this function contains ( , )Xp λ  combinations such that 1ρ = . 
Conversely, the open set to the southeast of this function contain ( , )Xp λ  
combinations such that 1ρ < . 
The ‘thick’ functions plot *λ  as a (discontinuous) function of Xp  with the off-
street price set at either €7 or €23.5. (These prices equal the marginal resource cost of 
off-street parking and the monopoly price, respectively). Consider first the lower 
function, *( ,7)Xpλ . If 7Xp > , all drivers park off street and * 0λ = . If, on the other 
hand, 7Xp < , the net surplus from parking on street induces some drivers to search 
and * 0λ > . The discontinuity in the function appears when 7Xp =  i.e. prices are 
equal across the two markets.  
 11
The sign of * Xpλ∂ ∂  is, in general, ambiguous (in the region X Yp p< ). 
Holding ρ  constant, it is clear from equation (4) that increasing Xp  reduces the net 
surplus from parking on street, ( ) ( )X Yv p v p− , and *λ falls. However, increasing Xp  
also reduces driver length of stay and thus increases the probability of finding a 
vacant spot, ρ . Increasing ρ , ceteris paribus, increases the expected value of the net 
surplus from searching and reduces expected search cost. Hence *λ increases. In 
general, either effect may dominate.8 In Figure 1, *( ,7)Xpλ falls in own price: the 
reduction in net surplus dominates. This is not the case for *( , 23.5)Xpλ , which 
increases in own price at values of Xp  below approximately 20. In this region, the 
increased probability of finding a spot and reduced search costs dominate. By 
contrast, the sign of * Ypλ∂ ∂  is unambiguously positive (in the region X Yp p< ). 
Increasing the off-street price increases the gain from parking on street and 
*λ increases.  
 
2.6. Equilibrium demand for off-street parking 
 
Demand for off-street parking per consumer, YD , is given by a fraction of 
consumers, 1 λ− , who proceed directly to the market, plus the fraction who search, 
λ , but fail to realise a vacant spot, 1 ρ− . Thus 
 
* *
*
( , ) [(1 ) (1 ) ]
[1 ].
Y X Y Y
Y
D p p t
t
λ ρ λ
ρλ
= − + −
= −  (5) 
                                                     
8 Standard manipulations reveal that * 0Xpλ∂ ∂ <  if [ ( ) ( ) ]X X X Yt p v p v p S ε′> − − , where ε  is the 
elasticity of parking time (with respect to own price). A lower absolute value of the elasticity and S ′  
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Consider different parameter regions. If X Yp p> , all drivers park off street i.e. 
* 0λ = and ( )Y Y YD t p= . If X Yp p≤ , the off-street market receives only residual 
parking demand i.e. ( )[1 ( )]Y Y Y XD t p pλ= − .  
 
2.7. Social welfare 
 
Expected social welfare is given by an unweighted sum of expected consumer 
surplus (from searching or not), expected on-street parking tax revenue and off-street 
producer surplus. This latter term can be written as ( )Y Y YND p C ND− . Social welfare, 
W , is therefore given by 
 
( )* *
*
( , ) (1 )
[ ]
( ).
X Y S Y
X X
Y Y Y
W p p N v v p
N t p
ND p C ND
λ λ
λ ρ
 = + − + 
+
−
 (6) 
In sections 4 and 5 below, the government is assumed to maximise this function with 
respect to the on-street price of parking, for different assumptions as to price 
formation on the off-street market. Before turning to these cases, however, it is 
revealing to examine the optimal centralised allocation. 
 
3. Centralised allocation 
 
Social welfare is given by expression (6). In this section we derive the optimal 
centralised solution i.e. we maximise social welfare with respect to three control 
variables: the fraction of drivers parking on street (λ ), and the length of stay both on 
and off street ( ,X Yt t ). It is straightforward to restrict the potential solution space to 
                                                                                                                                                        
implies a smaller increase in ρ and a smaller reduction in search costs. If so, it is more likely that the 
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this problem: it can never be optimal to have positive search costs (and thus 
Xt Qλ ≤ ); the inherent cost advantage of the on-street market implies that some 
consumers must always be allocated to it; declining marginal utility implies that all 
consumers must consume on one or other of the available markets. Using these, plus 
other simplifications (see Annex A), we write the optimisation problem confronting 
the government as one of maximising welfare, W  
 [ ] [ ]( , , ) [ ( ) 1 ( )] ( 1 )X Y X Y YW t t N u t u t C N tλ λ λ λ= + − − − , (7) 
subject to two inequality constraints 
 1
2
( , ) 1 0
( , ) 0.
X
X X
h t
h t Q t
λ λ
λ λ
= − ≥
= − ≥  (8) 
As shown in Annex A, the optimal solution9 to this problem depends on two 
parameters: Q  and (0)C′ plus the utility function. This is shown in Figure 2, 
assuming, for simplicity, that N =1. Aggregate parking supply is shown as a thick 
function. Q  units (on street) are provided at zero resource cost. Thereafter, (off-street) 
parking is provided at a positive marginal cost.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
Consider the case Q T>  (recall T is the length of stay at which the marginal 
benefit of parking is zero). This case is given in the Figure by demand curve 1u′ . On-
street supply is sufficiently large that, even when each consumer parks until marginal 
benefits are exhausted, demand is less than supply. In the optimal allocation, all 
                                                                                                                                                        
reduction in net surplus effect dominates. 
9 As is well known, if a global maximum exists to this problem, and if constraint qualification is met at 
that point, then the optimal solution is a critical point to the Kuhn-Tucker problem (see, for example, 
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consumers park on street and thus save off-street supply costs. Now, consider demand 
curve 2u′ . In this case Q T< . As 2 ( ) (0)u Q C′ ′< , it is optimal to allocate all parking 
demand to the on-street market, although it is necessary to restrict parking time to 
Xt Q=  so that demand equals supply. Finally, consider the case 3u′ . In this case 
3( ) (0)u Q C′ ′> . Annex A confirms that, as expected, the optimal allocation involves 
using both parking markets.  
We assume henceforth that ( ) (0)u Q C′ ′> (as in case 3 in the Figure). This is 
the relevant case for large metropolitan areas, where off-street parking forms a 
significant share of the overall parking market. This contrasts with the existing 
parking literature which, by abstracting from the off-street market, implicitly assumes 
(in terms of our model) that 0 ( ) (0)u Q C′ ′< ≤ . This assumption, as argued in the 
introduction, seems unduly restrictive.  
Annex A presents the formal proof of the optimal centralised allocation. 
However, the solution is quite intuitive. Firstly, for any given level of parking 
demand, total surplus is maximised when marginal utilities are equal across markets, 
which implies that drivers park for an equal length of time on either market or ** **X Yt t=  
(where the double star superscript denotes the optimal centralised allocation). 
Secondly, the on-street market is fully utilised i.e. ** ** **/ ( )X XQ t tλ λ= = . Finally, it is 
necessary to have an efficient quantity of total parking, which is met when **Yt (or 
equally **Xt ), is set such that marginal benefit equals marginal cost, or 
** **( ) ( [ ])Y Xu t C N t Q′ ′= − . This is shown on Figure 2. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sundaram (1996) Proposition 6.5). Annex A establishes that these conditions are met: moreover, there 
exists only a single solution for each set of values of our parameters. 
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For ease of comparison with later results, we collect the central result from the 
optimal allocation problem in the form of a Lemma: 
 
Lemma 1  Assuming ( ) (0)u Q C′ ′> , the optimal central allocation ( **λ , **Xt and 
**
Yt ) is given by 
 
** **
** **
** **
( ) ( [ ])
( )
X Y
X X
X
t t
u t C N t Q
tλ λ
=
′ ′= −
=  
 
Proof: See Annex A■ 
In order to derive explicit results, we examine a special case.  
 
Example  Assume that the quasi-linear utility function is quadratic (in parking 
time), such that ( ) 1u t t′ = −  and hence 1T = . Furthermore, assume that off-street 
parking is supplied under constant returns to scale, and thus ( )C t C′ ′= , a constant. 
Under the assumptions of Lemma 1, namely that 1Q C′< − , the optimal centralised 
allocation is given by 
 
** **
**
1
.
1
X Yt t C
Q
C
λ
′= = −
= ′−
 (9) 
 
4. Perfect competition off-street 
 
Can the optimal central allocation be decentralised? This is not obvious. In our 
centralised allocation problem the government uses three control variables. In a 
realistic market economy, however, we assume that the government has one: the price 
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of on-street parking. In particular, it can only indirectly control the number of 
searchers via equation (4). 
We examine this problem under the assumption that off-street suppliers take 
price as fixed. This assumption may be unrealistic in some cities, but it establishes an 
interesting benchmark case - section 5 below examines a non-competitive case. In 
section 4.1., we show that the government can decentralise the first best allocation 
using a linear fee. In section 4.2., we consider non-linear fee schedules. 
 
4.1. Linear on-street price 
 
The optimal on-street price can be derived by maximising social welfare, 
given by equation (6). However, we proceed more directly by demonstrating that a 
particular on-street fee results in the optimal centralised allocation in Lemma 1. Our 
candidate solution is a price, *Xp , such that 
* **( )X X Xt p t= . Assume, for a moment, that 
the off-street price is identical to the on-street price, i.e. * *X Yp p= . If so, off-street 
demand is **[ ]XN t Q− , and given perfect competition 
 * **( ( )) ( [ ])Y Y Xu t p C N t Q′ ′= − . 
By definition of **Xt , this implies that 
* * **( ) ( )Y Y X X Xt p t p t= =  and hence prices are 
identical across markets. This being the case, it is also clear that the equilibrium 
number of searchers equals **( )Xtλ . All three conditions of Lemma 1 are met. The 
resulting allocation is therefore first best. We summarise this result in a Proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Given a perfectly competitive off-street parking market, a sufficient 
condition to maximise social welfare is to set the constant per time unit price of on-
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street parking equal to the marginal cost of off-street supply at the optimal level of 
off-street demand. The resulting allocation is first best. 
Proof: In text■ 
 
In order to solve this problem, government needs to know consumer utility 
functions and the off-street supply function (though no information is required on the 
shape of the search cost function). However, a particularly simple policy emerges if 
the off-street market is supplied under constant returns to scale. To set the optimal on-
street price, government just matches the price of off-street parking. 
 
Corollary 1: If the off-street market is supplied under constant returns to scale and 
perfect competition, the optimal on-street price matches the price off-street i.e. 
* *
X Yp C p′= = . 
 
Corollary 1 is also directly seen from Figure 1. If the marginal cost of off-
street parking is €7 per hour, and the on-street price is set to match this price, it is 
clear that * **λ λ λ= = . Consider other pricing options. A higher on-street price results 
in all consumers using the off-street market and the total costs of parking supply are 
too great.  A lower price is also sub-optimal as total search costs are excessive. 
 
4.2. Non-linear on-street price schedule 
 
Non-linear pricing schedules, including the limiting case of a time restriction, 
are commonly applied to on-street parking markets. Proposition 1 establishes that a 
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linear fee is sufficient to implement the optimal centralised allocation. But it is not 
necessary: a non-linear fee can give the same outcome. 
Recall that the optimal fee structure decentralises the conditions of Lemma 1. 
Each consumer parks for **Xt  units of time, and a fraction 
**λ λ=  of consumers 
search. An infinite number of fee structures meet these conditions. Denote the total 
on-street fee as ( )XF t . Consider a one-part fee structure given by 
 
* ** **if 
( )
otherwise.
X X X
X
p t t t
F t
 ≤=  ∞
 
If a consumer parks on street, he parks for **Xt units of time and gains surplus
*( )Xv p . 
Hence, from equation (4), if *Y Xp p=  then **λ λ= . The residual demand for off-street 
parking is provided at marginal cost equal to *Yp . All three conditions of Lemma 1 are 
met. The resulting allocation is first best. 
It is common to observe a particular form of time restriction, which we term a 
‘simple time restriction’, in which drivers park for free up to a certain limit, r , and 
then must depart. It has a form 
 
0 if t r
( )
otherwise.X
F t
≤= ∞  
A simple time restriction10 cannot be first best. Consider a candidate solution, **Xr t= , 
which, to ease notation, we re-write as an implicit price, rXp  such that ( )
r
Xp u r′= , 
where, of course, * *rX X Yp p p= = . The resulting allocation is not first best. Rather, the 
consumer surplus from parking on street under such an instrument is equal to 
( )* *X Xv p p r+ , greater the ( )*Xv p obtained with a linear fee. As a consequence, too 
                                                     
10 In fact any strictly convex fee schedule in which (0) 0XF =  fails to decentralise the first best. A 
simple time restriction is, of course, just a limiting case of such a function. 
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many drivers search. To see this, rewrite equation (4), which gives an implicit 
equation for the optimal fraction of searchers, 
 ( )*( ) ( )r rX X Yv p p r v p Sρ ρ + − =   (5) 
which simplifies to 
 * ( )Yp r Sρ ρ= . 
This expression cannot be solved by λ λ=  (and thus 1ρ = ). Hence **λ λ> . The 
third condition of Lemma 1 is not met. 
Consider an alternative candidate solution. The time restriction, r , can be set 
such that the first best fraction of consumers search, **λ λ= . This is done by setting 
the implicit price of the simple time restriction, r  such that 
( )*( ( )) ( )r rX X Yv p r p r r v p+ = . Concavity of the utility function implies that this can 
only hold when *rX Yp p>  or *Xr t< . The first condition of Lemma 1 is not met. 
Calthrop and Proost (2002) derive the optimal simple time restriction (in the 
case of constant returns to scale in off-street supply). Not surprisingly, it falls between 
the two extreme cases considered above. Shortening the length of stay on street 
(relative to the off-street market) incurs welfare costs from an inefficient allocation, 
but reduces incentives to search. The optimal simple time restriction trades off these 
two distortions in an efficient manner.  
 
5. Off-street market power 
 
The off-street market is unlikely to be perfectly competitive. Spatial 
separation, at the very least, gives rise to market power. We adapt our model to 
investigate optimal on-street parking policy in such a setting. Firstly, we assume a 
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single supplier of off-street parking space, who supplies at constant marginal cost 
C′ .11  Secondly, we assume a simple sequential game, in which the government acts 
as a Stackelberg leader.12 This seems reasonable: governments are often constrained 
in their ability to change prices quickly. The private off-street supplier (the follower) 
observes the price on street and responds by setting a profit-maximising off-street 
price. Finally, to simplify matters, we focus on the case in which both players use a 
constant per time unit fee only. 
Recall from Corollary 1 that under perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale, the optimal policy for the government to pursue is just one of matching the off-
street price. When the off-street market is non-competitive, however, this is shown to 
no longer be the case. 
 
5.1. Analytics 
 
As is standard, we solve the game backwards. The off-street supplier 
maximises profits for given on-street price.  
 
Stage 2: Off-street supplier sets profit-maximising price 
 
Recall expression (5) for the equilibrium demand for off-street parking. If all 
consumers use the off-street market, i.e. ( )Y Y YD t p= , profit is maximised at the 
monopoly level, such that the percentage mark-up of price over marginal cost is equal 
                                                     
11 Allowing for convex technology is straightforward though notationally cumbersome. 
12 In choosing for a Stackelberg framework, we assume that the government can commit. Calthrop 
(2001) analyses Nash equilibria in a simultaneous move version of this game. However, the payoff 
functions of players are neither quasi-concave in own price nor upper semi-continuous in the joint price 
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to the inverse of the (absolute value of the) elasticity of parking time. We denote this 
monopoly price ( )mYp C′ . If mX Yp p> , the firm can do no better than charge ( )mYp C′ . 
If mX Yp p≤ , the firm faces a choice of strategy: either undercut the on-street market 
by epsilon and capture the full demand curve, or price at ( )mYp C′  on the residual 
demand curve. 
The profit (per person) from undercutting (subscript U) the on-street market13 
is given by 
 [ ]( ) ( )U X X Y Xp p C t pπ ′= − , (10) 
while the profit (per person) from playing the monopoly price (subscript M) on the 
residual demand curve is 
 ( ) ( ) 1
( )
m m
M X Y Y Y
X X
Qp p C t p
t p
π  ′ = − −     . (11) 
Consider two extreme values for the on-street price. If Xp C′= , undercutting leads to 
negative profit. Therefore the firm sets the monopoly price and makes positive profits 
on the residual demand curve. Alternatively, if mX Yp p= , equations (10) and (11) 
show that undercutting is more profitable than setting price equal to mYp .  
Between these two extreme values, there exists an on-street price at which the 
off-street supplier is indifferent14 between undercutting and playing the monopoly 
price. We denote this indifferent price by ( , )I Q C′ , given by the solution to the 
implicit equation ( ) ( )U MI Iπ π= , where it follows that mYC I p′ < < . The best-
response function of the off-street supplier is given by 
                                                                                                                                                        
vector. Equilibria in pure-strategies need not exist (see Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)), while mixed 
strategy equilibria are awkward to compute.  
13 This is the profit in the limit as epsilon tends to zero. 
14 To avoid unnecessary technicalities, we again assume an epsilon preference: the firm is assumed to 
undercut (play aggressively) when faced with price I . 
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if
( ) if
if .
m
Y X
m
Y X X X Y
m m
Y X Y
p p I
b p p I p p
p p p
 <= ≤ ≤ >
 (12) 
The intuition behind the best response function is straightforward. Undercutting is 
attractive when the on-street price is relatively high (though less than the monopoly 
price): the loss in profit per unit, compared with the monopoly price, is more than 
compensated for by having the full rather than residual demand. If the on-street price 
is relatively low, however, the reverse is true.  
The best response function is discontinuous: the off-street supplier jumps from 
playing the monopoly price to undercutting as the on-street price tends to I from 
below. Comparative statics reveal that 
 0 ; 0I I
Q C
∂ ∂< >′∂ ∂ . (13) 
Increasing Q  reduces the residual demand curve for off-street parking. Undercutting 
becomes more attractive. Increasing C′ , on the other hand, by increasing mYp , 
increases the profitability of capturing residual demand. Finally, note that I  is 
independent of the search cost. 
 
Stage 1: Government sets welfare maximising on-street price 
 
After observing the reaction of the firm in expression(12), government 
chooses a value of Xp  to maximise social welfare, given by
15 
 ( ) [ ]* * *( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )X S Y X X X Y X YW p v v b p t p b p C DN λ λ λ ρ ′= + − + + − . (14) 
                                                     
15 This equation is identical to equation (6) except we impose constant returns to scale.  
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This function is, naturally, also discontinuous at price I . Hence we proceed 
by examining local optima on the subset of prices respectively higher-than and lower-
than I . Consider the higher-than region: Xp I≥ . The firm undercuts and all drivers 
use the off-street market ( * 0λ = ). Expression (14) reduces to consumer surplus and 
firm profit.  Welfare is thus locally decreasing in on-street price. Reducing the price 
on street induces the firm to reduce the price off street. Given that the price off street 
is above marginal cost, this increases welfare. The locally optimal on-street price is a 
corner solution: Xp I= . At this point, welfare (in the high region), HW , is given by 
 ( ) ( )
H
U
W v I I
N
π= + . (15) 
Consider now the low price region: Xp I< . Social welfare, given in equation (14), 
simplifies to 
 ( )* *( ) (1 ) ( )mX S Y X M XW p v v p Qp pN λ λ π= + − + + . (16)  
Recall from equation (2) that, in equilibrium, ( )mS Yv v p= . The number of searchers 
adjusts such that the payoff is equal across the markets. Hence, social welfare is 
 ( ) ( ) ( )mX Y X M X
W p v p Qp p
N
π= + + . (17) 
All consumers gain the off-street surplus regardless of whether they search or not. 
Increasing the price of on-street parking has no effect on the consumer surplus of on-
street parkers: rather any reduction in welfare is exactly offset by an equal fall in 
search costs. There are only two effects from increasing the on-street fee: firstly, on-
street parking revenue increases and secondly, as more people are able to park on-
street, residual demand, and hence firm profit, falls. Strikingly, the change in welfare 
(in this local region) is equivalent to the change in joint profit.  
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Taking the derivative of (17), the impact on welfare of increasing the on-street 
price is 
 ( )[1 ]
( )
m
Y Y X
m
X X Y
p t pQ
p t p
ε
ε− , (18) 
where ε  just gives the elasticity of parking time with respect to price. Concavity 
implies that expression (18) is positive in the region mX Yp I p< < . Welfare increases 
in the price on street. A higher price ensures that more consumers successfully find a 
vacant on-street market. This does not affect consumer surplus (as, in equilibrium, 
drivers make ( )mYv p regardless of where they park). However, off-street profits and 
on-street tax revenues are affected. A higher price results in Q units of on-street tax 
revenue. This gain is traded off against the reduction in firm profit. The first effect 
dominates, however, at an on-street price below I (which recall is less than mYp ). 
The locally optimal level of welfare16 is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
L
m
Y M
W v p Q I I
N
π= + + . (19) 
Government has a 'knife-edge' problem: in raising the on-street price to I from below, 
welfare jumps from the level given by equation(19) to that of equation(15). We 
denote the difference in welfare by W∆ , which is given by 
 
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( ) ,
m
U Y M
m
Y
W v I I v p QI I
v I v p QI
π π∆ = + − + +
= − −  (20) 
where the second line follows from our definition of I . In raising the price to I , the 
off-street supplier is induced to undercut the on-street market. All drivers use the off-
street market, gaining consumer surplus ( )v I  rather than ( )mYv p . However, as all 
drivers switch to parking off-street, the government loses QI units of tax revenue. It 
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might appear that we also need to account for a change in firm profit, though recall 
profits are unchanged by switching strategy at price I .  
When is W∆ positive? Denote the derivative of W∆ with respect to Q  by 
QW∆  and note 
 [ ] 'Q
I IW I Q v
Q Q
∂ ∂∆ = − + +∂ ∂ , 
where, as established above, 0I Q∂ ∂ < . The first term in brackets captures the net 
loss in revenue from greater on-street supply. The second term captures the increase 
in consumer surplus from reducing I . The overall sign is ambiguous. 
Secondly, denoting the corresponding derivative with respect to the marginal 
cost of off-street supply by CW ′∆ , we note 
 ( )mYC p IW v Q vC C′
∂ ∂′ ′∆ = − − −′ ′∂ ∂ . 
A higher marginal cost increases the profit-maximising price (under mild regularity 
conditions). This increases the net benefit from allowing the on-street market to be 
undercut. Higher costs also raise I , however, and reduce both the consumer surplus 
and tax revenue from being undercut.  
Given the ambiguity of these terms, we use our numerical model to determine 
the sign of W∆ . 
 
5.2. Numerical results  
 
As discussed above, our numerical model assumes linear demand curves and 
constant returns to scale in the supply of off-street space. Moreover, it is calibrated to 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 Strictly speaking, this result holds at a price epsilon below I .  
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data on central London (see Annex B). The model results are presented in Table 1. 
Where appropriate, results are presented in terms of € per hour. For instance, under 
benchmark parameter values, the off-street monopoly price is €23.5 per hour, while 
the on-street price I  is €14.3 per hour. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
The first striking result is that W∆ is positive. This implies that the 
government should raise the price of parking on street until the point that the off-street 
monopolist undercuts the market i.e. to €14.30 but no further. Consumer surplus 
equals €41.3 per person. Total welfare (W ) is approximately 85 per cent of first best 
( FBW ), which is achieved by setting the price on both markets equal to marginal cost 
(recall Corollary 1). If the government lowers the price by epsilon below I , welfare 
equals W W−∆ , which accords to a welfare level some 70 per cent of the first best. 
 
5.3. Sensitivity tests 
 
Due to the large degree of uncertainty over parameter values, it is important to 
check the robustness of results. Table 2 presents our findings when varying the two 
key parameters: the on-street supply,Q , and the marginal cost of off-street supply, 
C′ . More precisely, while the first column of results reproduces the benchmark 
results (BMK), the second and third columns treble and halve Q  respectively (HI_Q 
and LO_Q), and the final two columns double and halve C′  respectively (HI_C' and 
LO_C'). Model results under the relatively high parameter value are shaded. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
The desirability of allowing the on-street market to be undercut seems a 
relatively robust result. Examining the row W∆ , we see that in 4 out of 5 scenarios it 
is welfare improving. The only exception is with a high marginal cost of off-street 
supply. In this case, I  becomes relatively large, and the loss in tax revenues, 19.6, is 
sufficiently large to outweigh the (modest) gain in consumer surplus in switching 
from the monopoly price to I  (approximately 16). Given the paucity of data on this 
parameter, and indeed even the conceptual difficulties in identifying the shadow cost 
of urban land, this scenario is arguably well within the range of plausible values. 
It is perhaps surprising that undercutting is socially desirable even with large 
variations in on-street supply, Q . Recall that, to ensure use of the off-street market, 
we assume that ( ) (0)u Q C′ ′> . In our parameterised model, this implies that 
4.125Q < . In our benchmark model, 1Q = , though we also investigate a high case, 
3Q = , and a low case, 0.5Q = . Raising the level of Q  reduces the size of residual 
demand and hence increases the relative profitability of undercutting. I falls from 14 
to 9, which in turn increases the consumer surplus from being undercut (60-17 = 43 
rather than 41-17 = 24). However, increasing Q  also increases the loss in on-street 
tax revenue from being undercut (27 rather than 14). The gain in consumer surplus 
from being undercut, however, more than outweighs the loss in tax revenue 
( 0W∆ > ). With a low Q , on the other hand, I  increases and both the gain in 
consumer surplus from being undercut and the loss in tax revenue decrease. Overall, 
however, it remains welfare improving to be undercut.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
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This paper examines the optimal regulation of the on-street parking market in 
the presence of a private off-street market. If the supply of on-street space relative to 
demand is sufficiently small, and if the supply of off-street space is competitive, the 
optimal price on street equals the marginal cost of off-street parking at the optimal 
quantity. This allocation is, moreover, first best (Proposition 1). In the case of 
constant returns to scale provision of space off street, this gives a particularly simple 
policy rule: the price on street should match the price off street (Corollary 1). We 
show that a simple time restriction, common in practice, induces excessive searching 
behaviour. Pricing instruments are thus more efficient, in this context, than this 
particular type of quantity instrument. 
Our simple matching rule is shown to break down if the off-street market is 
not competitive. We examine the extreme case of a monopolistic off-street supplier. 
The optimal on-street price is a ‘knife-edge’ result: the price on-street is raised either 
until the off-street firm is just induced to undercut the on-street market but no further, 
or as high as possible without inducing the firm to undercut. Our numerical model 
suggests that, for plausible parameter values, either type of result may dominate. Our 
results hold for any convex search cost function. The crucial insight is that if prices 
are equal across markets, drivers do not incur positive search costs in equilibrium.  
Certain caveats should be stressed. Firstly, we consider only a single 
monopolistic supplier of off-street space. This is sufficient to demonstrate that the 
‘matching’ type of result breaks down. A more realistic model, however, would 
consider an oligopolistic market structure. This may have important consequences on 
the desirability (and possibility) of the on-street market being undercut. 
Secondly, for simplicity, we assume identical consumers. The optimal 
centralised allocation and market allocation would differ in the presence of 
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heterogeneous consumers. In particular, a common policy is to separate spatially 
long-term parking from short-term parking. Time restrictions act presumably as a 
crude means of preventing commuters using spots allocated to short-term parkers. The 
efficiency of such a policy remains to be investigated. However, we conjecture that 
the basic insight of this model, namely that simple-time restrictions induce excessive 
searching, will hold in a heterogeneous setting17, as will the essential trade-offs from 
raising price in the presence of a non-competitive off-street market.  
Thirdly, we have not considered the interesting and pertinent issue of pricing 
parking space in the presence of underpriced road congestion. It would be useful to 
determine how different strategies for searching for a vacant spot (which route to 
choose, how much time to wait etc.) might interact with general traffic congestion on 
city centre streets and junctions. Different spatial patterns of parking pricing, for 
instance, might have very different impacts on congestion levels. 
                                                     
17 A referee has pointed out a different argument in favour of time restrictions: if the government would 
like to help the poor, they might want to make parking free but restrict the length of stay i.e. rationing 
might be optimal (see Guesnerie and Roberts (1984)). 
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7. Notation 
 
General 
N    number of individuals 
{ , }i X Y∈   index for on- and off-street parking 
,i it p    length of stay and price per time unit 
,u v    utility and consumer surplus from stay 
Q    supply of on-street peak period parking time 
( )C t    cost of supplying off-street parking time 
r    maximum length of stay 
T    length of stay at which marginal benefit equals zero 
*λ    equilibrium fraction of drivers that search 
λ    fraction of drivers such that demand equals supply on-street 
ρ    probability of finding a vacant on-street space 
S    search cost 
YD    aggregate demand for off-street parking time 
ε    elasticity of parking time with respect to own price 
W    social welfare 
 
Section 3 
 
** **, itλ    variables at optimal centralised value 
 
Section 4 
 
* *,i ip t    variables at optimal decentralised value 
XF    total fee for parking on street 
r
Xp    implicit on-street fee 
 
Section 5 
 
m
Yp    monopoly price off-street 
,U Mπ π   profit from undercutting/playing monopoly price respectively 
I    on-street price at which firm is indifferent between strategies 
Yb    best response function of the firm to a price on street. 
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Annex A: The centralised allocation problem 
 
The centralised allocation problem is given above as one of maximising 
equation (7) subject to constraints (8). The purpose of this annex is two-fold: firstly, 
to justify the restriction in the solution space used to search for an optimum, and, 
secondly, to prove the solution is a global maximum, as claimed. 
 
Restricting the solution space 
 
The government maximises social welfare, W, using controls of the time 
parked on each market, it  and the proportion of consumers allocated to each market, 
iλ  
 ( , , , ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )X Y X Y X X Y Y Y YW t t N U t U t C N tλ λ λ λ λ= + −  (21) 
Simple calculations18 reveal that 1Y Xλ λ= − : decreasing marginal utility of time 
parked implies that everyone should park for some time. Thus the maximand becomes 
 [ ] [ ]( , , ) [ ( ) 1 ( )] ( 1 )X Y X Y YW t t N U t U t C N tλ λ λ λ= + − − −  (22) 
Furthermore, it is also clear from inspection that some demand must be allocated to 
the on-street market. If not, some demand can be reallocated from the off-street to the 
on-street market, saving positive supply costs. Hence 0λ > , 0Xt > . 
The government maximisation problem reduces to maximising (22) subject to 
the following inequality constraints (each assigned a multiplier, kγ , k = (1,2,3)) 
                                                     
18 Assume 1 0X Yλ λ− − >  and , 0Y Ytλ > . Holding Xλ , Yt  and total off-street supply constant, welfare 
is improved by allowing a new driver to park for Yt units of time, although this requires existing off-
street users to park for a marginally shorter period. Similar conditions hold under all possible regions of 
the solution space.  
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 1 1 0,h λ= − ≥  
 2 0,Yh t= ≥  
 3 0.Xh Q tλ= − ≥  
The final step is to notice that if constraint 1h binds, Yt  drops from the objective 
function, and is thus indeterminate. If constraint 1h is slack, however, 0Yt >  given the 
standard (0) (0)u C′ ′>  assumption. Thus, there is no loss in generality in assuming 
0Yt >  and dropping constraint 2h . 
 
Optimal Solution 
 
We adopt a standard Kuhn-Tucker procedure to solve for the optimal points. 
However, this procedure is known to provide only necessary conditions to a local 
optimum when constraint qualification holds. However, following a standard 
procedure (e.g. Sundaram, 1996, Chapter 6), we identify the optimum by comparing 
the value of the solutions at all critical points. This is only valid when (i) a global 
optimum is known to exist, and (ii) when constraint qualification holds. 
We first show that these two conditions are met in this problem. Firstly, notice 
that, without loss of generality, we can restrict the domain of it  to 0 it T≤ ≤ . It is then 
clear that the domain of the problem is compact. An appeal to the Weierstrass 
Theorem yields existence of a maximum. 
To establish the second condition, we need to show that the rank of the matrix 
of derivatives of the effective constraints, evaluated at the optimal solution, equals the 
cardinality of the set of effective constraints. There are only three possible values for 
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the set Eh of effective constraints at the optimum, namely, ( )1 2,Eh h h= , 1Eh h=  and 
2Eh h= . (It is straightforward to show that Eh  does not contain the empty set). 
If both constraints are effective, we have 
 * *
1 0
( , )
1E X
Dh t
Q
λ − =  − −   
which is of full rank (i.e. matches the cardinality of the set). Constraint qualification 
holds in this case. It is straightforward to establish the same result under all possible 
values of the set Eh . Both conditions have been established. 
We then turn to the maximisation problem. The Langrangean for this problem 
is: 
 
( )
[ ]
1 2
1
2
( , , , , ) [ ( ) [1 ] ]
( 1 )
[1 ]
[ ]
X Y X Y
Y
X
L t t N U t U t
C N t
Q t
λ γ γ λ λ
λ
γ λ
γ λ
= + −
− −
+ −
+ −
 (23) 
which gives rise to the following set of 5 equations 
 2( ) 0X
X
L Nu t
t
γ∂ ′= − =∂  (24) 
 ( ) ( [1 ] ) 0Y Y
Y
L u t C N t
t
λ∂ ′ ′= − − =∂  (25) 
 
1 2
[ ( ) ( )] ( [1 ] )
0
X Y Y Y
X
L N u t u t C N t Nt
t
λλ
γ γ
∂ ′= − + −∂
− − =
 (26) 
 1 10, 1 0, [1 ] 0γ λ γ λ≥ − ≥ − =  (27) 
 2 20, 0, [ ] 0X XQ t Q tγ λ γ λ≥ − ≥ − =  (28) 
We solve for the critical points of this system, under each of the possible values of the 
set Eh . We examine each case in turn. 
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Case 1: 1Eh h=  
 
Since only constraint 1h  holds with equality, we have 1λ =  and 0XQ t− > , 
and, via the complementary slackness condition (28), 2 0γ = . Substituting this into 
equation (24), implies that *Xt T= . Condition (25) implies that *( ) (0)Yu t C′ ′= , which, 
given our assumption that (0) 0C′ >  implies that *Yt T< . Substituting into equation 
(26) 
 * * * 1( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]Y Y YNu T N u t u t t γ′− − =  
which implies that 1 0γ > . Finally, for equation (28) to hold requires Q T> . This is 
the only critical point and thus optimal. 
 
Case 2: 2Eh h=  
 
Since only constraint 2h  holds with equality, we have 1λ <  and XQ tλ= , and, 
via the complementary slackness condition(27), 1 0γ = . Substituting these results, 
plus equations (24) and (25) into (26) gives 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X X X Y Y Yu t u t t u t u t t′ ′− = −  
which implies that * *X Yt t= . To derive an expression for the optimal length of stay, 
substitute this result, plus * *XQ tλ =  into expression (25), giving 
 * *( ) ( [ ])X Xu t C N t Q′ ′= −  (29) 
This is clearly only optimal when *Xt Q>  or in other words, ( ) (0)u Q C′ ′≥  - the 
marginal benefit of additional parking time on the off-street market exceeds the 
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marginal cost. Again, this is the only critical point that solves this system and thus is 
optimal. 
 
Case 3: ( )1 2,Eh h h=  
 
Since both constraints holds with equality, we have 1λ =  and XQ t= . 
Substituting these results into equations (24) and (25), and in turn into equation (26) 
gives 
 [ ]{ }* * * 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y Y YN u Q u Q Q u t u t t γ′ ′ − − − =   
The left hand side is non-negative if *Yt Q≤ , which, on using equation (25) gives the 
condition ( ) (0)u Q C′ ′≤ . As in the other cases, this is the sole critical point and thus 
optimal. 
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Annex B: model calibration 
 
We assume quadratic utility such that the parking demand curve is given by 
( )u t tα β′ = −  and constant returns to scale in the supply of parking time off street. 
The numerical model requires estimates of four parameters: Q ,α , β  and C′ , plus a 
search cost function S . 
 
(i) Estimating Q  
 
We assume 12,000 on-street parking spots in central London (Hudson et al. 
(1993) report approximately 11,000 spots for 1989, while Elliot and Wright (1982) 
estimate 14,000 spots). Taking a peak-period equal to 5 hours, this gives 60,000 hours 
of on-street parking supply time. Hudson et al. (1993) - Fig.2 - report approximately 
60,000 parking acts, excluding parking at the workplace over the time period 0700-
1200. Thus on-street supply equals parking demand (at a zero price) when each driver 
stays for 1 hour. Hence 1Q = . However, to allow for uncertainty, we also investigate 
0.5Q =  and 3Q = .  
 
(ii) Estimating α  and β  
 
Hudson et al. (1993) - Fig. 5 - report that the average duration of stay in 
central London is 4 hours. No information is given on price. Given that some positive 
charges were in place for on-street parking, we assume that the average maximum 
stay (at zero price) equals the full length of the peak period, 5 hours. We assume that 
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the marginal willingness to pay for the initial hour is €40. These assumptions imply 
40α =  and 8β = . 
 
(iii) Estimating C′  
 
Banister (1990) - Table 3 - estimates the resource cost per hour for the City of 
London at £5.15 per hour. Using an exchange rate of 1.4 €/£, this converts to 
approximately €7 per hour. Thus 7C′ = . To allow for uncertainty, we also investigate 
upper and lower bounds: 3.5C′ =  and 14C′ = . 
 
(iv) Search cost function S . 
 
A review of the literature revealed few empirical estimates of search costs. 
One exception is Axhausen (1994). The average reported length of search for a vacant 
on-street spot is 10.9 minutes. The results relate to the U.K. city of Birmingham 
during a Saturday afternoon. Assuming time to be valued at £10 per hour, this 
suggests a search cost of approximately €2.5.  
As discussed in the section 2.4 above (particularly footnote 7), stochastic 
queueing theory suggests a convex cost function (in λ  and Xt ). We adopt the 
following functional form 
 (1 )( ) 1dS k e λ ρρ − = −  , 
which has the desired properties. The function depends on two unknown parameters: 
d and k . We ‘calibrate’ these parameters by assuming that two-thirds of drivers 
choose to search when the price of parking on street is equal to one-half of the 
resource cost of facility parking. This gives 0.1k =  and 1.5d = . Given the arbitrary 
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nature of this procedure, we perform considerable sensitivity tests on these parameter 
values. 
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Figure 1 Equilibrium number of searchers 
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Figure 2 The allocation problem 
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Table 1 Model results 
 symbol Value (in 
€/hr) 
Q  1 Parameters 
C′  7 
m
Yp  23.5 Variables 
I  14.3 
( )v I  41.3 
QI  14.3 
( )mYv p  17.0 
W∆  10.0 
W  64.7 
Welfare 
FBW  75.1 
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Table 2 - Sensitivity tests 
Scenarios   
BMK HI_Q LO_Q HI_C’ LO_C’ 
Q  1 3 0.5 1 1 Parameters 
C′  7 7 7 15 3.5 
m
Yp  23.5 23.5 23.5 27.5 21.8 Variables 
I  14.3 9.0 16.7 19.6 12.0 
( )v I  41.3 60.1 34.0 25.9 49.0 
QI  14.3 27.0 8.3 19.6 12.0 
( )mYv p  17.0 17.0 17.0 9.8 20.8 
W∆  10.0 16.1 8.7 -3.6 16.2 
W  64.7 67.8 62.2 41.3 78.8 
Welfare 
FBW  75.1 89.0 71.6 54.1 86.7 
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